We'll See You in Court! Forum Shopping and Territorial Dispute Settlement in Latin America (DRAFT) by Sotomayor Velázquez, Arturo C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2008-02
We'll See You in Court! Forum Shopping and
Territorial Dispute Settlement in Latin America (DRAFT)
Sotomayor Velázquez, Arturo C.
Sotomayor, Arturo. "We ll See You in Court! Forum Shopping and Territorial Dispute
Settlement in Latin America" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's
50th ANNUAL CONVENTION "EXPLORING THE PAST, ANTICIPATING THE FUTURE",
New York Marriott Marquis, NEW YORK CITY, NY, USA, Feb 15, 2009
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58535
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
               
We’ll See You in Court!  
Forum Shopping and Territorial Dispute Settlement in Latin America 
THIRD DRAFT 
"Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, February 15-18, 2008." 
 
Paper prepared by 
Arturo C. Sotomayor Velázquez 
Assistant professor  








In recent years a growing literature on the resolution of territorial disputes via judicial 
processes has flourished.  Countries willing to settle their maritime and territorial disputes 
have a plethora of forum options available, including regional and global tribunals.  Yet, 
some states seem to prefer global courts over regional tribunals.  What explains this choice 
of forum?  Does the overlap of two or more memberships in international organizations 
affect their relative use? The article explores forum selection by analyzing Latin American 
cases of territorial dispute settlement.  Evidence from these cases suggests that forum choice 
is not all strategic bargaining or institutional design.  Rather states seek specific courts 
influenced by regional and cognitive biases, as well as emulation and diffusion patterns. 
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In 1999, Nicaragua and Honduras instituted proceedings in the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) with regard to the legal issue subsisting between the two states concerning 
the maritime delimitation in the Caribbean Sea.  For decades, Nicaragua had maintained the 
position that its maritime Caribbean border with Honduras had not been determined, while 
the Honduras position sustained that its delimitation had been long defined by an arbitral 
award made by the King of Spain in 1906. (ICJ 1999/120)  The issue at stake seemed to be 
strictly bilateral and might have been easier for both Central American countries to pursue 
remedies bilaterally, through ad hoc mediation, or with the help of the many regional forums 
available in the Western Hemisphere.  For instance, since 2000, the Organization of 
American States (OAS) has a mechanism, the Fund for Peace, to help finance the costs of 
proceedings when the parties involved agree to turn to the OAS for assistance in resolving 
their disputes peacefully.  Yet, Honduras and Nicaragua mutually agreed to turn their case to 
the most global organization of judicial settlement; one which entailed high economic and 
judicial costs in terms of international arbitration and which took almost a decade to render a 
judgment.   
Interestingly enough, Honduras and Nicaragua are not alone.  After centuries of 
attempting different forms of third-party intervention, some countries in Latin America are 
now turning to global international organizations and international tribunals, such as the ICJ, 
to try to solve their territorial and maritime disputes.  In fact, all pending Central American 
territorial and maritime disputes, with the exception of the Guatemala-Honduras border 
conflict, lie in the hands of The Hague.  A smaller number of South American countries 
have also appealed to the Court, including Nicaragua in its territorial claim with Colombia 
and Peru-Chile.  One case, Guyana-Suriname, was submitted to international arbitration to 
the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea to delimit the maritime 
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boundary between the two states.  The OAS, by contrast, is not analyzing a single territorial 
or maritime dispute, despite the incentives provided by its Fund for Peace.  What explains 
this pattern of behavior among regional neighbors?  Why do countries in the region turn to 
global courts while overlooking regional forums of dispute settlement?  Why do countries 
prefer some forums while they discriminate against others?  Why the ICJ and not other 
tribunals? 
 The act of strategically choosing among different and overlapping international 
organizations to litigate a claim is often referred to as forum shopping.  It is a legal scholar 
term and a key part of any litigation strategy that also encompasses other consequential 
choices, including overlapping jurisdiction of treaties, tribunals, and sequential litigation 
claims.  Yet, forum shopping has received very little academic attention from international 
relations (IR) scholars. While there is an increasing literature available on forum shopping in 
international political economy, dealing essentially with trade and financial disputes1, little 
research has been conducted on forum shopping in international security, dealing with 
territorial borders and maritime conflicts.  The logic of forum shopping in trade is quite 
different from forum shopping in security, since not only the stakes are different, but border, 
territorial and maritime disputes often involve sensitive issues with strong connections to 
nationalism and sovereignty.  In fact, recent research on contentious issues has shown that 
territorial claims may be more difficult to solve than would be suggested by a strictly 
economic analysis.  (Hensel 2001, 85)  Unlike most economic disputes, conflicts over 
territory are more likely to involve military force and escalate into war.  As Paul F. Diehl 
argues, “not only are territorial concerns significant in generating militarized conflict, they 
also play a role in the dynamics of conflict behavior between disputants.” (Diehl 1999, xiv)   
                                                 
1 See for instance Busch 2007, Gantz 1999, Horlick 2003, Lopez 1997, Marceau 1997, Ortiz Mena 2001, Vega 
& Winham 2002-2003. 
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Hence, when countries decide to settle a territorial or maritime conflict, they too 
have to make strategic choices about forum options without eroding sensitive issues. In 
contrast to private international law, where individuals have a plethora of choices, the 
methods and permutations of forum shopping for states are not limitless.  Countries willing 
to settle their disputes can go bilaterally by mutually agreeing to a solution, trilaterally 
through third-party intervention, regionally via the mediation of a regional organization, 
multilaterally through the assistance of a global organization, or through legal means in the 
form of judicial settlement or arbitration.  The first four methods are termed diplomatic 
means and can take place in formal or informal forums.  The latter, however, require states 
to agree to a binding decision, usually on the basis of international public law and can 
involve the reference of a dispute to the ICJ or some other standing tribunal.2 
I contend that the overwhelmingly favorable preference to use the ICJ versus other 
forums of dispute settlement is largely determined by geographical and regional interactions 
that strongly influence the constraints and opportunity structures for individual states.  
Regional dynamics shape not only the biases against regional organizations, but have an 
influence on how states favor global forums.  Countries will in general avoid regional 
organizations if higher and more authoritative institutions in the global arena are available, 
since their procedures and rules often confer and withhold more international legitimacy 
than other regional options.  But the choice of a specific forum is narrowed by geography 
and proximity too.  States will shop for alternative forums by relying on the strategies, 
policies and decisions of other neighbors to inform their own actions.  In other words, 
regional interactions will induce states to mimic and emulate the actions of proximate actors.  
                                                 
2 International lawyers separate judicial settlement from arbitration, in which the former entails reference to 
established courts, while the latter requires the parties themselves to set up the machinery to handle the dispute.  
I will use both terms interchangeably since they both require the submission to a binding agreement.  See 
Merrills 2005, 91.  
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If one set of neighboring countries has been able to identify a forum for settlement, chances 
are that others will follow by emulating a similar strategy.  Hence, some Latin American 
countries have invoked the power of the ICJ not based solely on strategic and rational 
calculations, but influenced on what other close-by states have done with regards to similar 
territorial disputes.  As such, regional dynamics shape behavior, as geographic proximity to 
an actor constitutes a strong influence in determining the forum of settlement.     
It is important to note that this argument deals essentially with the selection of 
forum and does not address issues regarding compliance.  Forum shopping hardly 
guarantees that a border will be settled once and for all.  In fact, once a forum for resolution 
has been chosen, states can still disagree with the ruling and decide not to comply with it.  
Forum shopping merely provides insights as to where states are more likely to render their 
cases, once they have shown willingness to solve a dispute.     
To analyze forum shopping, I will focus primarily on Latin American cases.  A 
regional study offers three methodological advantages for improving our understanding 
about why states shop in some forums while they neglect others.  First, Latin America has 
the highest concentration of regional organizations after Europe, with treaties, agreements, 
and formal and informal institutions whose foundations go back to the nineteenth century.  
This part of the southern hemisphere has also witnessed a large number of territorial and 
maritime disputes, some of which have been settled though some form of institutional 
arbitration.  According to Beth Simmons, Latin America has the highest rate of territorial 
arbitration compared to other regions, with as many as 20 cases of arbitration in the past two 
centuries. (Simmons 2002, 836)  Consequently, these regional features provide an important 
test for alternative theories.  For instance, given the availability of regional forums, all of 
which vary in terms of their institutional design, Latin America should be the “most likely 
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case” for regional settlement.  Yet, the continent defies standard theoretical expectations, 
since many of these cases have rarely used or appealed regional organizations to reach 
territorial settlements, while most recent disputes are being handled by global organizations 
or other kinds of third-party intervention.    
Second, by looking at Latin American cases, I can hold other important suspected 
variables constant, since the countries share similar (although certainly not identical) 
underlying conditions, such as language, culture, and political regimes (democracy).  The 
analysis here presented will also center on the post-1990 period because I can gage variability 
in outcomes by holding two additional important suspected variables constant; namely, the 
demise and collapse of the Soviet block and the wave of democratization that emerged in the 
region.  
Third, the region shows variations in the dependent variable, where some states have 
used judicial and quasi-judicial settlement, while others have used third-party or trilateral 
intervention, and some have relied solely on bilateral negotiations.  Each case leads to 
multiple observations over time.   
Similarly, this study offers a number of theoretical and empirical insights for our 
understanding of international organizations.  First, it sheds light in explaining the explosive 
growth of law treaty and the so-called “legalization of world politics” by analyzing why states 
favor judicial forms of territorial settlement versus other forms of conflict resolution. 
(Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter, and Snidal 2000l and Keohane, Moravcsik, 
Slaughter 2000)  Second, this paper also explores the relationship between regional and 
global forums by analyzing how the availability of these organizations affects their use, 
compatibility and eventually their performance, leading to institutional variation.  Do 
regional failures allow for a prominent role of global multilateral institutions, such as the UN 
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and the ICJ?  Finally, a large legal literature is available on forum shopping, but little has 
been written on the political motivations of shoppers.3  This article provides political rather 
than legal arguments about forum shopping in international relations.  The act of delegating 
authority over dispute resolution is not only a legal move, but a political action of 
significance to both countries and international institutions.  As Keohane et.al. argue, “the 
legal form does not necessarily determine political process.  It is the interaction of law and 
politics, not the action of either alone, that generates decisions and determines their 
effectiveness.” (Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000,487-488)  Hence, a political 
explanation about forum choice is necessary.   
I use various qualitative research methods, including interviews, archival research and 
process tracing.  The findings presented below are based upon a series of confidential 
interviews conducted in 2008 in Mexico City, New York City, and Washington, DC.  The 
individuals interviewed were diplomats, OAS staff members, and lawyers who had familiarity 
with the pre-litigation phase of disputed cases. Unless indicated otherwise by citation, the 
interviews are the source of all positions describe below.  This article will proceed as follows.  
The first section establishes the main patterns of dispute settlement in post-1990 Latin 
America.  The second part briefly reviews and critique existing theoretical explanations that 
are relevant to this study.  The third section critically evaluate the regional forum choices 
                                                 
3 For lawyers, the considerations that may motivate a forum shopper involve the convenience or expense of 
litigating in a specific venue, the inconvenience to one’s adversary, the probable or expected sympathies of a 
potential jury pool, the nature of appellate reviews, judicial calendars, and interjurisdictional differences.3  Some 
legal explanations will tend to focus on arbitration agreements and jurisdiction clauses to explain the forum 
selection.  Submission to a specific forum is often determined by the existence of treaties or agreements that 
provide for an arbitral tribunal or specify a jurisdiction to which parties can submit their cases.   Ultimately, 
forum shopping is essentially about identifying proper legal competence, jurisdiction, procedural laws, and legal 
rules.  (Goldsmith 1997, Born 2006, Helfer 1999)  Legal motivations are relevant in understanding forum 
shopping, especially if one considers that lawyers are often delegated the task of representing states in 
international courts.  To some extent, dispute settlement, via diplomacy or arbitration, is an attempt to insulate 
a conflict from the day-to-day political demands of states.  Specifically, what a judicial settlement process does 
is to literally legalize a dispute by making it a subject matter of law rather than politics or military strategy; in 
other words, de-politicize and de-militarize a dispute by transforming it into a legal conflict.     
 7
available in the continent and explains how diffusion and emulation have influenced the 
choice of forum. 
 
PATTERNS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA POST-1990 
 As mentioned above, forum shopping is a legal practice by which litigants 
strategically chose among competing jurisdictions.  As such, Latin America is not foreign to 
this concept as countries in the region have shopped for various forums of international 
dispute-settlement, ranging from diplomatic to quasi-judicial and judicial methods of 
resolution.  While the mechanisms of territorial and maritime conflict resolution have varied 
throughout time, certain general patterns can be identified.  In dealing with border and 
maritime disputes, Latin American states have relied on bilateral, trilateral, regional, global 
and judicial forums. 

















To some extent, all Latin American states with border disputes have dealt with 
bilateral mechanisms, given their geographic proximity.  Every unresolved territorial dispute 
that is not under the good offices of a mediator or third party can be subject to bilateral 
negotiations.  As of today, there are at least 11 cases pending resolution in Latin America 
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that are not under any form of bilateral or third-party negotiation.4  Surprisingly, some key 
disputes have been settled bilaterally.  In the post-Cold War period, Argentina and Chile 
were able to solve most of their outstanding boundary disputes through bilateral 
negotiations.  The Argentine-Chilean rapprochement began in 1978 with the Pope’s 
successful mediation effort of the Beagle channel dispute.  The issue was solved with the 
signature of the 1985 Treaty of Peace and Friendship; a binding agreement, ratified by both 
countries, supported by an Argentine referendum that effectively conceded sovereignty of 
the channel to Chile.  Since then, the two countries have relied on bilateral diplomacy to deal 
with their other disputes.  In 1991, Presidents Patricio Aylwin of Chile and Carlos Menem of 
Argentina settled twenty-three out of twenty-four outstanding territorial disagreements 
through executive action and direct negotiations, without the assistance of any international 
institution or mediator.  A failure of the Argentine Congress to ratify an agreement reached 
between the two governments left the Hielos Continentales as the only pending territorial 
dispute between these two former foes. (Escudé and Fontana 1998, 67)  Likewise, another 
instance of successful bilateral territorial dispute settlement was the treaty signed between 
Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago in April of 1990.  This bilateral effort put an end to a 
conflict over the jurisdiction in the Gulf of Paria waters (even though it created another 
dispute with neighboring Guyana, who claims the treaty violated its own maritime 
sovereignty.)    
Nevertheless, bilateral negotiations have often failed as a mechanism of conflict 
resolution in Latin America.  For instance, in the early 1990s both Bolivia and Peru made 
                                                 
4 Argentina-UK, Bahamas-US, Barbados-Trinidad & Tobago, Bolivia-Chile, Bolivia-Peru, Brazil-Uruguay, 
Colombia-Venezuela, Cuba-US, Dominica-Venezuela, Guatemala-Honduras, Haiti-Navassu Islands (US).  




several bilateral attempts to resolve their respective territorial disputes with neighboring 
Chile, yet the three countries have failed to agree on any solution. (Domínguez 1998, 15)  In 
1998, Menem visited London and stated that Argentina would use only peaceful means to 
recover the disputed Falklands/Malvinas islands.  In 2001, Tony Blair reciprocated by 
visiting Argentina.  He encouraged both countries to resolve their differences that led to the 
1982 war.  However, no bilateral agreements or negotiation on sovereignty took place during 
these bilateral visits. 
The failure to bilaterally solve a dispute is the reason why a third-party is often called 
on to help.  As Page Fortna argues, third-parties help disrupt any of the causal pathways to 
war and make peace agreements more durable by increasing the costs of attack, by reducing 
uncertainty about actions and intentions, and by preventing and controlling accidental 
violations and skirmishes. (Fortna 2004, 487)  Within the Latin American region, countries 
have relied on ad hoc regional mediators, regional institutions, global organizations, and 
world tribunals to overcome their mutual suspicions while attempting to solve territorial and 
maritime claims. 
For instance, the most successful regional mediation effort took place between 1995 
and 1998, when four regional guarantors (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the US), as defined by 
the 1942 Rio Protocol, effectively helped Ecuador and Peru to settle their dispute over the 
Cenepa Valley, for which they fought at least two wars.  This process entailed a bilateral 
binding boundary agreement, subject to international public law, followed by a peacekeeping 
mission. (Herz and Pontes Nogueira 2002)  While successful, this has been a rather unusual 
and unique process of dispute settlement in Latin America, since it relied essentially on an ad 
hoc regional forum that was outside the Inter-American System and which, in fact, by-
passed the OAS.  Furthermore, the guarantor does not have the same formal features of an 
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arbiter, since as Beth Simmons argues, “while third parties acting as guarantors may be 
expected to increase the treaty implementation, this guarantee is subject to caveats that 
reduce the certainty of the guarantee itself.” (Simmons 1999b, 8)  No other ad hoc regional 
forum has been put in practice since then. 
Belize and Guatemala have attempted to solve their dispute through a regional 
mechanism too, but with a much more formal approach, by appealing to the OAS Fund for 
Peace.  On November 8, 2000, the heads of the delegations of both countries signed an 
agreement to adopt a comprehensive set of negotiations, mediated by the OAS, to resolve 
their territorial differendum that originated two centuries ago between Britain and Spain over 
their colonial territories in Central America.  The dispute endured following their 
independence from Spain in 1839 and from the United Kingdom in 1981, respectively.  It 
involves a Guatemala claim to gain access to the Atlantic sea through the Caribbean, 
entailing almost two thirds of Belize’s territory.  At the core of the dispute lies what 
Guatemala sees as the inability of the UN General Assembly to reach a satisfactory solution 
to Guatemala's unresolved territorial claims against Britain, in November of 1980.  
Nevertheless, like previous bilateral and UN efforts, the OAS mediation failed in 2007 when 
Guatemala rejected the proposals from the OAS-sponsored facilitation process.  The two 
countries are now preparing their respective legal teams to begin proceedings at the ICJ, 
pending a referendum on the matter in Guatemala.  This remains the only case of dispute 
settlement brought to the OAS forum by a Latin American state.5 
                                                 
5The other cases brought to the Fund involve the implementation of a demarcating boundary established by 
the ICJ between El Salvador and Honduras, and negotiations to improve relations between Honduras and 
Nicaragua, who have also summoned their cases to The Hague.  No new cases have been referred to the Fund 
since 2003.  For cases being analyzed by the Fund see 
<http://www.oas.org/sap/espanol/cpo_sustentabilidad_programas_paz_documentos.asp> 
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Countries in the region have also relied on third-mediation by global organizations.  
For example, the UN Secretary General has been called upon several times to mediate 
between Venezuela and Guyana.  Since gaining independence from Spain in the 19th century, 
Venezuela has claimed parts of Guyana’s territory, which is believed to be rich in minerals 
and oil.  In 1899 an international tribunal awarded most of the territory to Britain, then the 
colonial power in Guyana, but Venezuela has periodically protested the outcome, so the 
matter was referred to the UN Secretary General, first in 1984 and again in 1991, when a UN 
special envoy was appointed.  However, since Hugo Chávez arrived to power, third-party 
UN mediation efforts have continuously failed.  Irritated by the decision of neighboring 
Guyana to allow an American company to build a satellite-launching center, President Hugo 
Chavez has denounced UN efforts, Guyana and the US.  As of to date, the UN mediation 
attempt is stalled. (Rohter 2000; Serbín 2003)  Similarly, in January 2002, Honduras raised at 
the UN Security Council El Salvador’s alleged refusal to give effect to the 1992 ICJ ruling 
regarding their border dispute.  The Council, however, refused to take the case in 2003.  The 
Argentine-UK dispute over the Falklands/Malvinas islands has followed a similar pattern.  
Argentina has approached the world body several times; while the UN General Assembly 
and the UN Decolonization Committee have repeated calls for the resumption of 
negotiations, especially since the restoration of the Argentine democracy. (Resolution 
GA/COL/3122)  Yet, talks in the UN forum have not led to any form of negotiation. 
This leads us to our final form of conflict resolution; namely, the judicial mechanism 
by means of adjudication to an international tribunal, as opposed to an arbiter, guarantor or 
mediator.  Interestingly enough, the number of cases invoking courts has increased in the 
past years.  On September 20, 2007 the Guyana-Suriname Arbitral Tribunal established 
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea made public its findings on the long-
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standing maritime controversy between these two countries.  Suriname actually tried to 
prevent the Tribunal from reaching a conclusion by arguing that it had no jurisdiction on the 
matter.  The Tribunal, however, found that it had the authority to establish the maritime 
boundary between the two claimants and established that Guyana had sovereign rights to 
explore and exploit the hydrocarbon resources within the boundaries of the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, which were once contested by Suriname.  This has so far been the only 
maritime dispute brought by a country in the Western Hemisphere under the UN 
Convention of the Law and the Sea.   
More readily used has been the ICJ in The Hague.  Historically, the Court was never 
the preferred forum for dispute settlement in Latin America.  From 1948 to 1990 The Hague 
delivered one single ruling with regards to a Latin American territorial and frontier dispute.6  
In 1960, by fourteen votes to one, the Court held that a territorial award given by the King 
of Spain in 1906 was valid and binding in favor of Honduras; thus obligating Nicaragua (the 
loser country) to give its effect. (ICJ 1960/31)  More than three decades would pass before 
the Court would deliver another ruling involving a Latin American territorial conflict.  The 
trend of invoking courts and judicial arbitration, as opposed to political and diplomatic 
mediation, began before the end of the Cold War, when a joint Honduras-El Salvador 
commission that was unable to settle a bilateral territorial dispute, decided to remit the case 
to the ICJ for its consideration in 1986.  On September 12, 1992, seven years after the first 
request was made, the presidents of both countries met at the border to receive the final 
ruling to a dispute that had caused the ultra famous Soccer War between these two 
neighboring Central American states.  The ruling, again, favored Honduras more than El 
                                                 
6 The ICJ had heard other Latin American cases regarding non-territorial and frontier disputes, including the 
US-Nicaragua, and the Nicaragua-Honduras, Nicaragua-Costa Rica case regarding frontier incidents and 
armed attacks in the 1980s. 
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Salvador, because the former was granted the right to two-thirds of the disputed territory.7  
Although officially accepted by both states, this ruling has failed to lower border tensions 
and has even prompted Honduras to approach the UN Security Council, while El Salvador 
requested a revision of the judgment to the ICJ in 2002.  In spite of the final decision, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and many others have since continued to invoke the 
power of the Court.     
Since 1992, almost all Central American territorial and maritime disputes, with the 
exception of Guatemala-Honduras, have been surrendered to The Hague.  As mentioned 
earlier, El Salvador requested a revision of the ICJ’s1992 judgment in 2002; Nicaragua 
turned to the ICJ twice in 1999 and again in 2001 to delineate its border disputes with 
Honduras and Colombia, respectively; Costa Rica brought a case against Nicaragua in 2005 
to resolve its dispute concerning navigational and related rights on the San Juan River.  
Likewise, in South America, Peru instituted proceedings in 2008 against Chile concerning the 
delimitation of its boundary in the Pacific Ocean.  Belize and Guatemala are now following 
their neighbors by preparing their case to the Court.   
In sum, the fact that some Latin American countries are now invoking legal and 
judicial forms of settlement when historically they haven’t is intriguing.  It is especially 
puzzling given the fact that they have regional forums available, which often entail less legal 
costs and perhaps more expedite resolutions.  Why invoke a global tribunals and not other 
regional forums? Why the ICJ? 
 
                                                 
7 The ICJ found that Honduras had sovereignty over Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay and South Cay.  
At the same time, it delineated a single maritime boundary in accordance to Nicaragua’s preferences at a point 
with the co-ordinates 15° 00' 52" N and 83° 05' 58" W; that is 2º co-ordinates less of what Honduras had 
originally claimed. (ICJ Press Release 2007/23)   
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COMPETING EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORKS: FORUM SHOPPING IN 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Forum shopping has been defined as a “litigant’s attempt to have his action tried in a 
particular court of jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or 
verdict.” (Harvard Review Association 1990, 1677)  Political scientists and legal scholars 
have developed different theoretical approaches to understand why states prefer some 
formal organizations over others.  These approaches can be classified as rational design 
institutionalism (RDI), domestic-legal arguments, and constructivist explanations.  While 
they all provide sophisticated tools to analyze forum shopping, they are insufficient to 
explain why Latin America states have turned to global courts while overlooking their own 
regional forums. 
 First, the RDI is the most recent project grounded on rational choice that seeks to 
account for the wide range of design features that characterize international institutions.  In 
trying to explain why major institutions are organized in radically different ways, advocates 
of this research agenda have also argued that “states pay careful attention to institutional 
design” and thus rationally discriminate among international organizations based on their 
institutional features, such as membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility. 
(Koremenos, Lipson, Snidal 2001, 762-763)  To some extent, forum shopping is the product 
of a market-oriented mechanism whereby different methods of dispute settlement are 
offered at different forums and from which states can choose based on their design, assets 
and liabilities.  Three key institutional dimensions dominate the literature on forum 
shopping; membership, flexibility and centralization.8 
                                                 
8 Some of these key dimensions overlap with variables used by other institutionalists.  For instance, Keohane, 
Moravcsik and Slaughter, in their analysis of legal dispute resolution, refer to independence (who controls the 
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 For instance, Marc L. Busch, in his study of overlapping institutions and trade 
dispute settlement, argues that a complainant choice of forum depends on “whether it 
prefers to set a regional or multilateral precedent, or no precedent at all.  Setting a precedent 
means adding to an institution’s body of case law concerning the obligation in dispute.  It 
matters because, according to Busch, it can facilitate future litigation, and encourage more ex 
ante settlement, in relation to other members of the same organization. (Busch 2007, 736)  
The use of a forum is ultimately dependent on the treatment of membership; that is how 
ample or restrictive are the membership rules in setting regional or multilateral precedents.  
Following a similar logic, Beth Simmons has argued that solving territorial conflicts can help 
increase the terms of trade, allow for regional integration and solve future economic 
conflicts among states.  Her argument implies that territorial dispute settlement via 
international arbitration can set precedents to solve outstanding economic issues. (Simmons 
2002, 832-836) 
 By contrast, Walter Mattli considers that flexibility and centralization best explain the 
choice of forum arbitration.  In his study of private settlement of cross-border trade and 
investment disputes through commercial arbitration, Mattli finds that institutional flexibility 
often determines the institution for arbitration.  Forums offering the highest levels of 
procedural flexibility will be preferred against those who are most inflexible with their rules.  
Institutional flexibility comprises features such as the number of arbitrators, the 
appointment of judges, the place of arbitration, and the powers of tribunals.  (Mattli 2001, 
925)  Likewise, institutional centralization is favored when there is uncertainty about the 
behavior of other actors and the state of world affairs.  As Mattli argues, “traders with little 
experience in international exchange or traders from very different cultural and linguistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
adjudication), access (who sets the agenda), and embeddedness (who controls the formal implementation.  
(2000) Overall, these variables are synonymous of control and centralization.  
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regions may rely more heavily on centralized support and expertise for resolving their 
disputes than veteran traders operating in a relatively homogenous region.” (Mattli 2001, 
922) 
The RDI agenda has shed important light on the nature of forum shopping, most 
notably by identifying key features that can be measured and compared across different sets 
of forums.  Yet, institutional design insights offer poor guidelines to analyze forum shopping 
in territorial dispute settlement.  The use of precedents when making legal judgments is 
probably prevalent in international trade and finances, but virtually absent in international 
public law.  Forums such as the ICJ will only analyze cases on their own merits; their rulings 
have binding force only for the parties involved, while the judges abstain from dealing with 
similar previous cases to make their judicial decisions.  In other words, the legal procedures 
in international public law prevent the application of the common law doctrine of stare decisis 
or precedent from applying to judgments of the Court.9  For this reason, a case settled 
among one set of countries will rarely be used as a precedent against another set of countries 
or members.10  So precedents based on regional or multilateral membership are not strong 
determinants of forum choice either, at least not among parties with territorial or maritime 
conflicts. 
 On the other hand, flexibility is an institutional characteristic that can be valued by 
states, but not for the reasons argued by the RDI agenda.  In his assessment of Latin 
American institutions, Jorge Dominguez argues that Inter-American organizations “have 
been flexible to the point of ineffectiveness.” (Dominguez 2007, 122)  Arie M. Kacowicz 
                                                 
9 This does not mean that the Court will be inconsistent with its own rulings.  In fact, it rarely departs from its 
earlier decisions, but decisions by the Court are not applicable to other cases and the decisions are binding only 
between the parties which have submitted their dispute to the tribunal itself.  The Court may use previous cases 
as a reference, but only to ensure consistency.  For a discussion of how the ICJ uses precedent cases, see 
Crawford and Grant 2007 and Shahabuddeen 2007. 
10 For an analysis of the ICJ’s procedures see  John Collier and Lowe 1999, pp. 175-185. 
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considers that Latin American states designed very legal forms of institutions, only to 
displace them by less legal forms of organization; so the countries were formal and legalistic 
in their principles, yet informal and pragmatic in their workings. (Kacowicz 2005, 44)  But 
even with such flexibility at hand, states in Latin America have rarely settled their disputes 
through regional forums.   
Moreover, if flexibility is indeed something that disputants prefer among institutions, 
as claimed by the RDI research agenda, then certainly the outcome would not favor 
organizations such as the ICJ.  Of all options available for territorial dispute settlement 
(bilateral, trilateral, regional, multilateral and judicial settlement), international courts offer 
the least flexible forums.  In The Hague, disputants can only choose one ad hoc judge; the 
rest is determined by very inflexible rules that govern the highest international tribunal.  
Proceedings are made public, the powers of the tribunals are set by the UN Charter, the 
arbitration takes place in the Netherlands, and public international law is the only applicable 
law.  By contrast, centralized expertise is an institutional feature that should favor regional 
forums, since being local means they are closer to home and surely know more about their 
members and their needs.  In spite of the flexible, inflexible or centralized institutional 
designs, Latin American countries have shopped at different forums, but rarely turned to 
regional organizations. 11 
Domestic-legal scholarship offers a second source of theoretical explanation to 
account for the selection of forum.  Both legal scholars and political scientists are often 
inclined to explain forum preference by focusing on the characteristics of the domestic legal 
structure.  That is, states are usually more willing to pursue international organizations that 
reflect their own domestic institutions than those that do not.  According to Andrew 
                                                 
11 For a critical review of the RDI endeavor and its shortcomings see Duffield 2003. 
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Moravcsik, a domestic legal system, which constitutes an embodiment of societal 
preferences, interests, and ideas, can determine a state’s behavior towards other states and 
international institutions. (Moravcsik 1997)  For instance, states with civil law systems are 
more likely to accept compulsory jurisdiction of international courts than states with other 
forms of legal systems, such as common and Islamic laws. This is so because international 
public law most closely resembles civil law in its use of bona fides (or good faith in 
contracting) and in its disregard for jurisprudence (the use of precedents.)  By virtue of 
sitting in The Hague, the ICJ is exposed to continental European legal traditions, which are 
predominantly civil.  The institutional similarity between international public law and civil 
legal systems encourages civil law countries to approach international courts for arbitration.  
As argued by Powell and Mitchell “civil law states accept similar legal principles domestically, 
which makes it easier for them to correlate their behaviors, and the adjudicator and civil law 
disputants will converge naturally on the same outcomes.” (Powell and Mitchell 2007, 403) 
However, an explanation based on domestic legal systems does not properly explain 
why the ICJ has recently become the preferred forum of territorial dispute settlement in 
Latin America.  Most countries in the world system are ruled by civil law traditions, yet Latin 
America has the highest propensity to submit to legal rulings vis-à-vis other regions, 
including continental Europe, where civil law was founded.  According to a study by Beth 
Simmons, there had “never been a legally constituted third-party ruling on a land border in 
Europe, there have been two between independent countries in Africa, two in the Middle 
East, three in Asia, the Far East and the Pacific, and twenty in Latin America!” (Simmons 
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1999, 214)12  To date, one half of the court’s docket is made of Latin American cases, 
including four instances of territorial and maritime disputes.13   
Moreover, if the legal tradition determines the forum, then we should have seen 
more historical cases adjudicated to the ICJ, since most Latin American countries have been 
ruled by civil law for centuries.  Yet, interest in The Hague is a relatively recent trend in Latin 
America and this attraction cannot be attributed to prevalence of civil law, since the latter 
has been a constant.  Furthermore, The Hague is not the only international tribunal 
mandated by international public law; other regional and global courts use similar 
procedures, yet they are not invoked as often as the ICJ by countries with civil law traditions.  
Finally, the fact that countries as diverse as Guyana, Surinam, and perhaps even Belize, are 
pursuing a settlement via an international tribunal despite their common law tradition casts 
some doubt about how domestic law influences the choice of forum.  At best, the domestic 
legal tradition is only a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition to explain why 
states prefer international tribunals to other forms of dispute settlement. 
  Finally, constructivist explanations offer a third theoretical approach by focusing on 
the role of international legitimacy.  From this perspective,  actors are not only concerned 
about maximizing material gain, but share a number of legitimacy concerns about the 
authoritative and moral power of the institution that they are invoking. (Acharya & Johnston 
2007, 13)  As Ian Hurd argues, international legitimacy is a subjective quality between an 
                                                 
12 Simmons seems to have overlooked other ICJ rulings regarding Eastern and Central European cases of 
territorial and maritime settlement.  The ICJ has settled cases in Europe, although some of these cases are 
relatively recent, belonging to former Communist countries in the post-1990 era.  In any case, Latin America 
still has the highest rate in using judicial settlements.  See Appendix 2 for cases analyzed by the ICJ.  
13 The ICJ is not only looking at territorial disputes in Latin America, it also analyzes non-territorial disputes, 
such as the Argentina-Uruguay conflict for the pulp mills, the Ecuador-Colombia conflict for aerial spraying, 
and the US-Mexico conflict regarding consular rights for illegal immigrants.  Of the 12 pending cases currently 
under the jurisdiction of the ICJ, 6 belong to Latin America, 4 to Europe and 3 to Africa.  See “Pending 
Cases”, the International Court of Justice, < http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2&sort=2&p3=0>. 
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actor and an institution and is defined by the actor’s perception of the institution. (Hurd 
2007, 6)  Internatioanl legitimacy emerges from the organization’s complex of symbols, 
authority, and history.  From this perspective, specific forums will be preferred provided 
they confer and withhold collective legitimation from actors and decisions; that is, when its 
actions, statements and resolutions have been recoginzed as representing the views of a large 
sentiment of the world’s states. (Claude 1967)  For Hurd, this often takes place when its 
utterances carry more force than had they been carried out by individuals members, and 
when the actions and pronounces represent the collective sentiment of the international 
commnity. (Hurd 2007, 6) 
A constructivist approach accounts for the apparent Latin American bias towards the 
ICJ.  The Hague is not only the highest international court available, but its relative neutral 
composition, as well as its history in delivering impartial rulings provides strong incentives to 
invoke its power.  International legitimacy raises the costs of non-compliance by affecting 
the reputation of those who decide to ignore its ruling and authority.  But international 
legitimacy is not an exclusive attribute and the ICJ is not the only organization that confers 
international legitimacy.  The UN Security Council, the Holy Sea and even the Court in 
Hamburg have collective legitimation authority; yet they are not invoked as often as the ICJ.  
The Latin American puzzle thus remains unexplained and the constructivist research agenda 
provide only a partial explanation as to why states refer their cases to global courts as 
opposed to regional organizations.  If anything, the region points the analyst of forum 
shopping to look for insights from within the region by analyzing regional trends. 
   
IMPARTIAL FORUMS AND REGIONAL DIFFUSION DYNAMICS 
An explanation as to why Latin American states by-pass their own regional 
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mechanisms of conflict resolution is necessary in order to analyze the choice of forum for 
territorial dispute settlement.  Hence this section will first analyze the bias against regional 
organizations and then explain the preference for international tribunals by focusing on 
regional clustering and policy diffusion.      
 
Cheap Talk in Regional Forums: Explaining the Regional Bias  
Countries in the Americas have a plethora of regional organizations, treaties, 
agreements, and even tribunals to go to in order to solve their disputes.  The forums 
available vary in terms of scope, domain, level of institutionalization, and even membership.  
With the exception of Europe, no other regional block has produced so many treaties, 
conventions and resolutions with the objective of promoting conciliation and understanding 
of states.  As Juan Carlos Puig argues, “no other group possesses such a diversified and, at 
times, sophisticated panoply of juridical resources.” (Puig 1983, 11)  At the same time, Latin 
America’s numerous border, territorial and maritime disputes provide a role, if not a 
mandate, for these regional mechanisms to operate.  Nevertheless, as demonstrated in 
section one, there are very few instances of regional dispute settlement, involving only 
Ecuador-Peru and Belize-Guatemala. 
Latin American countries willing to solve their mutual conflicts can appeal to twelve 
varying forms of treaties and institutions14, although only three types of forum deal 
specifically with the settlement of territorial disputes: a) a legally-binding agreement of 
conflict resolution, b) a regional framework; and c) sub-regional organizations.  First, the 
American Treaty of Pacific Settlement, also known as the Pacto de Bogotá, is the principal 
                                                 
14 A full list of Western Hemisphere treaties is available in Paul R. Hensel (2005) data set, version 1.4, available 
at <http://data.icow.org>. 
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instrument for peaceful resolution of dispute settlement.  Conceived in 1948 by a Mexican 
diplomatic initiative that was backed by Brazil, it covers every kind of international conflict, 
except those dealing with domestic disputes.  Its procedures include good offices, mediation, 
conciliation, investigation, judicial settlement, and arbitration.  It also indicates the 
institutional steps to be followed in case one of the parties refuses to carry out the award, 
such as invoking the ICJ and the OAS Council.  According to Juan Carlos Puig, from a 
strictly legal point of view, the Pacto de Bogotá is perfect, as it has no gaps or fissures that 
would leave its functioning subject to the will of the parties. (Puig 1983, 13)   
The second Inter-American forum option available to Latin American states is more 
flexible in its approach; it involves the invocation of the OAS.  This institution emphasizes 
the peaceful settlement of disputes in its article 13 and encourages states to use diverse 
mechanisms ranging from negotiation to arbitration in article 24.  States shopping in this 
institutional venue can invoke its procedures directly or indirectly.  Countries can turn to the 
OAS directly by summoning its Inter-American Peace Commission, which is a pre-
jurisidictional organ that replaced the Inter-American Peace Committee in 1956 and whose 
mission is to “permanently see that those States among which there is, or may arise, conflict 
of any nature whatsoever, reach a solution as soon as possible, and to suggest to this end, 
without detriment to the formulae chosen by the parties” (OAS Charter)   
An even more flexible option is available by directly appealing to the Permanent 
Council of the OAS, since it has specific competence on issues regarding the resolution of 
controversies through peaceful means.  With the consent of the parties, it too can exercise 
good offices on its own or through the Inter-American Peace Commission, and can 
disseminate information by submitting reports to the General Assembly and the Secretariat. 
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Alternatively, member-states can use the OAS Fund for Peace.  Created in 2000 
under the initiative of former OAS interim Secretary General, US Ambassador Luigi 
Einaudi, this forum is perhaps the most innovative mechanism of dispute settlement 
established in the post-Cold War era within the Inter-American system.  Ambassador 
Einaudi, who had played a key negotiating role as part of the US guarantor delegation to the 
Ecuador-Peru territorial conflict, implemented some of the lessons learned from the Andean 
region in an attempt to strengthen the OAS capacity for peacebuilding.  He realized that just 
like the Guarantor states in the Ecuador-Peru case, the OAS could provide expertise in 
diplomacy and international law by establishing a formal agency within the organization in 
charge of centralizing all regional mediation efforts.  He also recognized that regional 
powers, such as Brazil and the US, had played a significant role by providing resources and 
economic support.  Hence, the fund would help defray the costs of proceedings by relying 
on donations from powerful member states, like Brazil and the US, and other permanent 
observers.  He also grasped that an ad hoc and flexible approach had best served the 
interests of Ecuador and Peru.  So, unlike the Pacto de Bogotá, which is a formal document, 
the Fund could rely on a much flexible approach by offering a range of conflict resolution 
mechanisms contemplated under the OAS Charter, including direct negotiation, good 
offices, mediation, investigation, conciliation, judicial settlement and arbitration.15  Finally, 
the American Ambassador also reasoned that the Guarantor states had left Ecuador and 
Peru with orphan agreements, since as he explains: “once the peace agreement was signed, 
their parents left with unfulfilled promises.”16  Consequently, Einaudi thought of the Fund as 
a tool to help implement the agreement, while ensuring that the promises derived from it 
                                                 
15 On the establishment of the OAS Fund for Peace, see OAS resolution on Peaceful Settlement of Territorial 
and Maritime Disputes AG/RES.1756 (XXX-O/00). 
16 Personal phone interview with Ambassador Luigi Einaudi, former interim-Secretary General of the OAS, 
November 26, 2008, New Olreans, Louisiana. 
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would be properly delivered with the resources available to the OAS.  In his view, the 
combination of flexibility, centralization, membership, and resources would offer strong 
institutional incentives for Latin American states to approach the OAS.   
If the OAS framework is not appealing enough, a third and final forum option is 
available in the form of sub-regional tribunals.  Specifically, the Central America countries of 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua have the choice of referring their claims to the 
Central American Court of Justice (CACJ), which has the ability to analyze cases between 
member, non-member states and even legal persons, provided they agree to the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  More than any other international tribunal, the CACJ best reflects the legal 
traditions of Central America, since it is based not only on civil law, but it emanated from a 
common regional history and appoints its justices from a pull of jurists from within the 
region itself.   
Nevertheless, a critical evaluation of all these regional forums indicates that they 
have been underused at best or neglected at worse.  In spite of their legal-binding 
arrangements, the Pacto de Bogotá and the CACJ have never been called upon to deal with 
territorial or maritime disputes in post-1990 Latin America.17  General procedures within the 
Pact have not been normally applied due to the dearth of ratifications and reservations that 
in many cases totally set aside compulsory jurisdiction.18  For Scheman and Ford, the Pact is 
vivid testimony “that rigid and compulsory procedures make it a good legal document… but 
a poor political one.” (Scheman and Ford 1985, 205)   
                                                 
17 The Pacto de Bogotá has been invoked by Latin American countries in the ICJ, but it has been essentially 
mentioned as a justification to why the case is being brought The Hague.  Historically, only one case has been 
brought the Central American Court in 1906…(check) 
18 As of 2008 the treaty had 21 signatory states, of which only 15 ratified it, with 7 imposing reservations to its 
statue. See As of 2008 <www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/firmas/a-42.html> 
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The OAS framework is the only regional forum that has been invoked at least once, 
but it has had a mixed record and continues to be underused.  The Organization has been 
relatively successful in containing some crises and military disputes when they emerge, 
especially among Central American states and most recently between Ecuador and 
Venezuela; yet it has been historically unable to secure a permanent settlement of territorial 
and maritime disputes. (Domínguez 2008, 96 Shaw 2004, 71-85, Lyon 1970, 126-127)  The 
Fund for Peace, which provides strong economic incentives to lower judicial costs and settle 
disputes faster than the ICJ, failed to settle the one single dispute it was commissioned to 
deal with between Belize and Guatemala. 
While other regions may behave similarly, Latin America is particularly puzzling 
because unlike Asia or Africa, and even Europe, it is the only region that possesses such a 
high concentration of institutions dealing specifically with the pacific and legal resolution of 
territorial and maritime disputes.  Other regions might be tempted to go to The Hague in the 
absence of regionally-binding forums, but Latin America has plenty of them, yet states rarely 
use them. 
The under-use of regional organizations is even more puzzling if one considers that 
Latin American foreign policy has been ruled by a collective and normative understanding 
that favors legal obligations among regional neighbors. This common regional understanding 
is based on the expectation and practice that countries from the Americas will engage in 
pacific settlement whenever conflict emerges. (Domínguez et.al. 2002, 23)  For that purpose, 
they have relied on international public law to regulate their external behavior by appealing 
to various regional norms, such as non-intervention, sovereignty, good offices, mediation, 
and arbitration.  (Kacowiz 2005)  At the same time they have behaved as norm 
entrepreneurs by encouraging and spreading regional norms that applied exclusively to them. 
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(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)  For example, jurists from the continent formulated laws to 
limit the ability of nations to use force to protect the interests of their national citizens in 
foreign countries; this principle is now widely known as the Calvo and Drago Doctrines. 
(Connell-Smith 1974, 111-115)  Uti possidetis (as you possess, so you may possess) was 
devised by Latin American republics after their independence as a relief measure against the 
need for treaty delimitation of international boundaries of several adjoining states.  Through 
these doctrines, most boundaries between former Portuguese and Spanish colonies were 
accepted as things existed in 1810, for South America, and 1821, for Central America. 
(Cukwurah 1967, 112-116, 190-199; Lyon 1970, 122-123; Domínguez et.al. 2002, 21-22)  
While Latin American states have relied on these common, regional and normative 
understandings in their mutual interactions and even developed their own diplomatic culture, 
they have rarely, if ever, invoked their own regional institutions to settle a disipute when it 
arises. 
Institutional design features offer few insights in understanding these regional forum 
choices.  As mentioned above, the abundance of regional forums available in the Americas 
varies in terms of institutionalization, flexibility, centralization, membership and binding 
mechanisms, but the outcome remains the same.  Likewise, domestic legal traditions are not 
inspiring countries to rely on their very own sub-regional courts, which in some aspects 
mirror their domestic tribunals.   
By contrast, international legitimacy does provide a cogent and logic explanation as 
to why regional forums are disliked.  Latin American countries are legitimately concerned 
about the impartiality and neutrality of regional forums.  Certainly, there is the fear that most 
regional institutions tend to reflect the interests and preferences of the regionally powerful 
actors. (Acharya and Johnston 2007, 19.)  As David Mares argues, “US power and geography 
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have meant there would be no great-power concert or balancing in Latin America… 
producing fundamental security externalities for each and every Latin American nation.” 
(Mares 1997, 198)   Even when the US is not the major source of concern, regional powers 
can still influence outcomes.  Bolivia once vigorously supported an OAS exit to its dispute 
with Chile, but then had a sudden change of mind when José Miguel Insulza –a native of 
Chile- became the OAS Secretary General in 2005.  Likewise, diplomatic discussions about 
revitalizing the CACJ were opposed by most of Nicaragua’s neighbors, especially Honduras, 
in part because this regional tribunal is headquartered in Managua.    
Nevertheless, being surrounded by regional powers might offer strong incentives to 
use regional institutions too, since the most influential countries can always endow 
institutions with resources, capacity, leadership, and diplomatic support to carry-on with 
their mandate.  The Ecuador-Peru settlement clearly demonstrated that a concert of regional 
powers can indeed change the preferences of the disputants from conflict to cooperation by 
inducing them to settle for an agreement.  The bias against regional organizations in Latin 
America is not due to lack of regional leadership or power. 
Instead, regional organizations may actually make accommodation more difficult by 
providing incentives for cheap talk.  Going regional imposes two sets of dilemmas, which in 
turn question their ability to withhold legitimacy from actors and decisions.  First, there will 
always be the temptation to go to a higher, more authoritative and legitimate court.  
Countries in the Americas know that regional forums are not the last resort.  If all goes 
wrong regionally, they can still appeal to global courts without being damaged by 
reputational costs for not abiding to regional rulings.  Ultimately, if an agreement negotiated 
under regional auspices seems adverse for domestic ratification, then states can simply reject 
it and then favor a solution via a global tribunal.  This enables rival states to win time or 
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freeze a conflict, while pretending to settle the dispute.  As one lawyer working for a legal 
firm that provides international legal counseling explains: “going regional is often merely a 
strategy used by the counterpart to win time to prepare the case in the ICJ.”19    
Second, the information provided by regional organizations becomes an institutional 
liability rather than an asset.  Indeed, the regional forum reveals strategic information about 
the parties in dispute: their positions, claims, and historical and legal records.  This often 
allows claimants to know in advance the rival’s stand and provides ample opportunity to 
explore his/her weaknesses if the case is then taken to a higher international tribunal.  
Hence, the problem with most regional organizations is not that they lack information and a 
system to centralize it, but they often know too much about their members, making 
settlement difficult.  
For this reason, jurists like J.G. Merrills believe that while boundary disputes are 
almost always intra-regional, regional organizations generally have little to contribute.  In his 
view, regional mechanisms often provide “the antagonists with the diplomatic and material 
support necessary to continue the struggle.” (J.G. Mills 2005)  This view was shared by the 
early literature on regionalization, which cautioned that regional organizations had only 
limited success at resolving the issues behind disputes. (Nye 1971, Haas 1983)  Paradoxically, 
their very own potential –closeness to home- becomes the major source of weakness, since 
proximity often compromises the organization’s mission. 
To some extent, the Belize-Guatemala territorial conflict is a vivid example of this 
regional dilemma.  The OAS facilitated negotiations by establishing a conciliation panel, led 
by Guyana’s diplomat Sir Shridath Ramphal and by US lawyer Paul Reichler.  The panel 
favored Belize more than Guatemala, since the former was granted more territory; but it did 
                                                 
19 Personal and confidential interview with a legal advisor and lawyer at Dewey and LeBoeuf who requested 
anonymity, Washington, D.C., October 14, 2008. 
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recommend some adjustment to the land border and new maritime limits giving Guatemala 
an economic exclusion zone (EEZ).  For that purpose, Belize and Honduras each agreed to 
contribute 1,000 square nautical miles to Guatemala’s zone. The OAS also recommended 
the establishment of a tri-national ecological park covering the three Central American 
states.  
However, the Guatemalan government rejected the offer, citing that Honduras and 
Belize would still have more benefits out the EEZ, making the deal extremely difficult to 
ratify at home.  In September 2003, the United Kingdom, which by then had become a 
major donor to the Fund for Peace, joined the OAS Group of Friends.  Yet its presence 
raised Guatemala’s concerns about the Organization’s impartial status, since Belize is a 
former British colony.  In other words, the proceedings of the OAS were not perceived as 
legitimate by one of the actors.  By 2007, regular meetings of both countries, under the 
auspices of the OAS, failed to reach agreement on a definitive solution, leading its Secretary 
General to recommend a solution via an international tribunal. (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office 2008)  
In sum, the OAS provided information about Belize’s case and gave Guatemala 
access to historical colonial records provided by the British; yet the OAS proposal ultimately 
favored Belize’s claim; this eventually tempted the Guatemalan government to search for a 
favorable judgment in an alternative and more authoritative forum.  On the other side, 
Belize feels betrayed by its neighbor, since in its view Guatemala had stalled the negotiations 
and played cheap talk all along.  This situation has certainly offered incentives for both 
countries to go global, while it might have dissuaded other future litigants form pursuing a 
regional solution.  This does not mean that countries will neglect the OAS all along.  In fact 
some countries might return to the regional organization to help them in implementing 
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decisions from other international tribunals, as was the case between El Salvador and 
Honduras.  Yet, they will rarely invoke the OAS to settle the dispute itself, given the relative 
availability of higher global courts and the risk of becoming a victim of cheap talk.  So, why 
do states prefer the ICJ and not other legitimate and global forms of settlement?   
 
Diffusion, Emulation and the Neighbourhood Effect  
 The previous section examined why Latin American states tend to avoid regional 
organizations, but this still leaves a lot of room for choice, since there are multiple global 
organizations that states can refer to.  For instance, most disputes in Latin America involve 
maritime differnda, including Peru-Chile, Nicaragua-Honduras, Costa Rica-Nicaragua and 
even Belize-Guatemala.  These states have at least four different alternative means for 
settlement: a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, b) the ICJ in 
The Hague, c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with the Convention of the Sea, 
d) and a special arbitral tribunal.  Paradoxically, even with all these options available, only 
Guyana and Suriname have turned to a tribunal different to The Hague. 
 Latin America’s interest in the Court is relatively recent, since historically countries 
have tended to invoke other forums, including European countries, kings, popes, the US, 
and regional powers.  While the ICJ is one of the most authoritative and legitimate 
international tribunals to date, its invocation entails high costs because the proceedings are 
expensive and its judges often take decades before ruling.  It is also the most inflexible 
forum, allowing states to have very little control over the cases and procedures.  The 
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outcome can be uncertain too, since past rulings are not used to inform present cases.  In 
fact, more than one disputant country has been stunned by the Court’s decisions.20   
Certainly, its neutral composition makes it particularly appealing vis-à-vis regional 
forums.  Beth Simmons recognizes the benefit of having a neutral legal authority handy 
when she argues that “even if an arbitration panel produces the same terms as did political 
compromise, some domestic groups will find it more attractive to make concessions to a 
disinterested institution than a political adversary.” (Simmons 2002, 834)  Nevertheless, there 
are many tribunals that offer such neutrality and international legitimacy, including the one in 
Hamburg, so why do Latin American states continue to refer their cases to The Hague and 
not to Hamburg? 
International legitimacy and reputation costs can play a role, especially when states 
anticipate that they will pay a higher cost in the long run if they break their commitments.  
States willing to solve their disputes might be tempted to turn to forums that increase those 
costs in order to ensure enforcement. (Simmons 1999, 2002; Mitchell and Hensel 2007)  Yet 
a variety of forums can help increase reputation costs and increase the legitimacy of a ruling.  
For instance, Argentina accepted the Pope’s mediation and ruling in 1978 regarding the 
Beagle Channel dispute, in part because the military junta perceived the Papal institution as 
carrying moral authority; rejecting the Pope’s judgment would thus have incurred prestige 
costs.  Interestingly enough, Guatemala and Belize considered the Papal path too when OAS 
negotiations failed in 2007, but in the end The Hague option is being preferred over all other 
forums.21  Why The Hague and not the Holy See? 
                                                 
20 In 2002 the ICJ surprised Nigeria when, in a controversial ruling, awarded the Bakassi peninsula to 
Cameroon, whose residents consider themselves Nigerian and who had opposed being transferred to 
Cameroon.  (ICJ 852/2002)  
21 Personal and confidential interview with a senior diplomat from Belize, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2008. 
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Evidence from these cases suggests that forum choice is not all strategic bargaining.  
Rather, there appears to be a diffusion wave whereby neighboring states have adopted 
similar patterns of settlement by imitating and emulating each other.  International diffusion 
entails the adoption of similar policies in varied national settings, which produces 
commonality in diversity.  According to the theoretical literature available on international 
economic policy, diffusion patterns have at least three distinct features, a wavelike character, 
a geographical clustering, and the spread of commonality amid diversity. (Weyland 2005; 
Skrede Gleditsch 2002)  To some extent, Latin America’s preference for forums such as the 
ICJ has followed a diffusion pattern that is linked spatially. 
First, mapping the number of times the ICJ has been invoked and adopted as the 
preferred forum resembles a wave, with an S-shaped curve and a bell-shaped pattern.  
Interest in The Hague began very slowly in the mid eighties and nineties and has evolved as 
more states have appealed to the Court’s power.  The ICJ had originally very few followers, 
beginning first with El Salvador-Honduras in 1986, leading to the 1992 ruling.  By the end of 
the 1990s the trend expanded to cover Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Colombia.  By 2005 more 
than half of Central America’s border and frontier disputes were under the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  Gradually, the wave reached South America in 2008, as Peru, Chile and 








































Second, if Latin America has followed a diffusion policy trend, then we should also 
see geographical clustering in the data on the distribution the cases brought to the ICJ.  
Diffusion theories suggest that proximity prompts imitation, leading to a strong pattern of 
policy regional diffusion.  (Collier and Mesick 1975, Walt 2000)  Indeed, the wave spread 
first in Central America, among small and neighboring states with symmetrical military 
capabilities.  This is also a sub-region of Latin America where states interact regularly via 
trade and through various diplomatic networks.  They also share a common history, since 
many of these countries experienced similar patterns of civil wars in the eighties and 
eventually hosted UN peacekeepers in the nineties. 
The maps below show the distribution of cases for four distinct periods.  They all 
show regional patterns of geographical clustering over time.  The first phase began 1990 with 
El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua; all countries that originated the wave and share a 
common dispute regarding the Golf of Fonseca.  These are all neighboring states that, 
surprisingly, had an alternative regional court to go to, their very own CACJ, yet followed the 
ICJ path.  The second period began in 2001, when Costa Rica brought its northern neighbor, 
Nicaragua, to the court itself for the San Juan river dispute.  This trend expanded further in 
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2003 to cover a third instance when Nicaragua sued the South American nation of Colombia 
for a dispute regarding the Caribbean islands of San Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina.  
By 2008 the contagion effect reached the Southern Cone, when Peru brought a suit against 
neighboring Chile over the location of their maritime border.  The trend continues as both 
Belize and Guatemala are preparing their case in The Hague, in which case all Central 
America disputes –with the exception of Guatemala-Honduras- would have been put under 
the jurisdiction of the Court itself.  This suggests the existence of a diffusion pattern, where 
“models usually spread first in the region in which they originate and only later search other 
areas.” (Weyland 2005, 266)      























When asked why Guatemala and Belize now prefer the ICJ over other forums, a high 
level diplomat interviewed for this study responded that “all of our neighbors have gone to 
the ICJ.”22  This finding is again consistent with policy diffusion theories, which often argue 
that the closer two actors are to each other the greater their mutual relevance.  Diffusion, 
indeed, tends to be higher between proximate actors.  (Skrede Gleditsch 2002, 5) 
Consequently, the geographic interaction context of Central America has influenced the 
constraints and opportunity structures available for individual states.  
Third, commonality of policies can be identified among the diversity of cases.  
Territorial disputes in Latin America vary in terms of the claims and historical legacies, but 
they share common features; not only do they all involve frontier disagreements, but they 
entail serious differences of interpretation regarding international treaties on the delimitation 
of borders. (Orozco 2003) Latin American countries go to a tribunal because they want 
someone to interpret numerous colonial documents supporting expansive claim over 
                                                 
22 Personal interview with Ambassador Jorge Skinner, Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the OAS, 
Washington, D.C., August 2008. 
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territory.  From this perspective, legalization is a way of de-politicizing and de-militarizing a 
conflict by making it subject to legal interpretation.  But what is interesting about the Latin 
American cases is that in spite of their different legal claims, they use similar wordings and 
language to file their cases in the Court, suggesting strong emulation trends among the cases.   
In suing Colombia in 2001, Nicaragua referred to article 31 of the Pacto de Bogotá 
(referred but never called upon or invoked the Pact itself) to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ: 
As a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, Nicaragua invokes Article 
XXXI of the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (officially known 
as the “Pact of Bogotá”), signed on 30 April 1948, to which both 
Nicaragua and Colombia are parties. Nicaragua also refers to the 
declarations under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, by which 
Nicaragua and Colombia accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court, in 1929 and 1937 respectively. (ICJ Press release No. 2008/4)   
 
The Pacto indeed stipulates that if states fail to settle their disputes, then they can appeal to 
The Hague.  This was the first time that a Latin American country had referred specifically 
to the Pacto to establish the Court’s jurisdiction; a strategy that would soon be emulated by 
others.  In 2005 Costa Rica mimicked the strategy of its neighbor Nicaragua to bring him to 
to the court by alledging that “The Court also has jurisdiction over the present dispute in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 1, of its Statute, by virtue of the 
operation of the American Treaty of Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Bogota, 30 April 1948, 
Article XXXI.” (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua ICJ 2005)   As soon as the Court accepted the 
arguments of Costa Rica, in 2008, Peru used the same article and treaty as the basis for the 
Court’s jurisdiction in its case against Chile, in a way emulating Nicaragua’s and Costa Rica’s 
procedures. (ICJ Press release No. 2008/1)  This case is now being closely followed by 
Bolivia, which may soon consider a similar path in its maritime claim against Peru and Chile, 
both of whom ratified the Pacto and have used the treaty to create judicial jurisdiction.     
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Emulation is evident not only in the procedures, but in the legal practice too.  States 
hire the same legal practitioners to represent them in international courts.  This practice 
often increases the costs of litigation, but reinforces policy diffusion.  For instance, Foley 
Hoag is a legal firm headquartered in Washington DC that provides international legal 
counseling to several countries.  It was Foley Hoag which drew heavy notice among Third-
World diplomats when one of its lawyers, Paul Reichler, successfully represented Nicaragua 
in the ICJ against the US in 1984. (ICJ REP. 392, 1986)23   It currently runs a practice that 
now has four cases before the Court, representing a full third of the 2008 august court’s 
docket.  Four of the firms’ clients are Latin American states who have been attracted by the 
success of its practice, including Nicaragua.  (Ford 2008)  Dewey and LeBoeuf is the other 
legal firm located in New York City with expertise on territorial dispute settlement.  Its 
practice includes representing Honduras against El Salvador before the ICJ –a case won 
against Foley Hoag in 2007- and representing Suriname in the delimitation of its maritime 
boundary under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.  Its successful practice has now drawn 
the attention of Guatemala, which might hire the firm in its case against Belize, now 
currently advised by Foley Hoag. 
Finally, there is the question of who is making the final decision to invoke the ICJ’s 
power.  In Latin America, the study of foreign policy decision-making has focused on the 
individual level, including the role of the executive branch and presidential systems. 
(Domínguez and Lindau 1984)  As Jeanne A.K. Hey and Frank O. Mora argue, “Latin 
                                                 
23 Specifically, Nicaragua charged the US for being involved in the unlawful use of force by training, arming, 
equipping, financing and supplying forces within its own territory, with the clear purpose of overthrowing its 
government.  In a surprising ruling, the ICJ sided with Nicaragua and found the US to be in breach of its 
international obligations. (ICJ REP. 392, 1986) While the US ignored the ruling and disputed the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the case was seen as a David versus Goliath legal battle.  The ICJ’s ruling in effect gave Nicaragua 
an important legal victory.  While this incident did not deal with a territorial claim per se, it effectively modified 
perceptions about the Court itself, especially in Central America.   
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America’s political culture, specifically its tradition of personalism and authoritarianism rule, 
has accentuated the role of the executive.  Latin American foreign policy, more so than 
domestic policy, has traditionally been the preserve of the executive and the narrow elite.” 
(Hey and Mora 2003, 4)   
Nevertheless, most presidents are advised by a small cohort of foreign policy experts 
and in Latin America this group tends to be dominated by lawyers or economists.  This is 
seen not only in the approach the countries use to deal with each other, but also in the 
practice, where lawyers and economists are usually in charge of supervising and 
implementing foreign policies.  In other words, jurists are de facto the regions’ diplomats.  
This is reflected in the appointment of ambassadors and foreign affairs ministers who 
overwhelmingly tend to be lawyers or economists.24  The historical practice of appointing 
lawyers as diplomats has reinforced the idea and perception that foreign policy in Latin 
America is essentially a legal or economic more than a political issue. 
Yet, the legalization of foreign policy emphasizes regional diffusion policies.  It 
means that decisions to go to court rely on a rather small cohort of individuals who in fact 
share a similar view of world affairs.  Increased policy cohesion often lead decision-makers 
to reject certain paths in favor of others based not necessarily on cost-benefit assessments, 
but on cognitive and personal biases. (Weyland 2005, 283)   
In Guatemala, for instance, the foreign policy making has been dominated by a small 
group of economists and lawyers who have advocated for a legal path in the dispute against 
Belize.  The most influential figure in this strategy has been Ambassador Gert Rosenthal, a 
                                                 
24 Argentina, Brazil and Mexico have even appointed some of these jurists to serve as chief justices in the ICJ.  
Mexico, for instance, has rarely participated in the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member, following 
a non-interventionist and mostly pacificist foreign policy tradition; but four of its most distinguished diplomats 
have served as judges in the ICJ: Isidro Fabela, Luis Padilla Nervo, Roberto Córdova and, currently, Bernardo 
Sepúlveda.   
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widely renowned economist who has made his public career by serving in and for the UN in 
several posts.  Although an economist by training, Rosenthal knows the ICJ procedures with 
some degree of expertise.  He is often referred as the ultimate Guatemalan expert in the UN 
system since he served twice as permanent representative in New York from 1999 to 2004 
and currently.  As minister of foreign affairs from 2004-2007, he supported the idea of 
invoking the Court’s power.25  Thus, the nature of Latin America’s foreign policy-making 
style that emphasizes international public law and economic development provide a strong 
impetus that favors judicial settlement via the UN system.  This translates into an excessive 
importance given to the Court’s procedures as the only logical option available.  If regional 
dynamics are added to these cognitive and personal biases, then the decisions to appeal the 
ICJ appears less strategic than it is often assumed. 
 Therefore, most Latin American countries have followed similar strategies in 
instituting proceedings in the ICJ.  They have followed the El Salvador-Honduras model 
more readily than the Belize-Guatemala (OAS), Ecuador-Peru (regional ad hoc) or the 
Guyana-Surinam (Convention of the Sea) models.  So far, the region remains hooked on the 
Court, as more and more cases are being instituted in The Hague; thus suggesting a diffusion 
pattern subject to regional emulation and cognitive biases.    
 
Conclusions 
 Adjudication to international tribunals has emerged over the past two decades as one 
of the preferred methods for settling a growing number of territorial and maritime disputes 
in Latin America.  The most important conclusion drawn from this analysis is that although 
governments have a broad range of regional and multilateral options for settling their claims, 
                                                 
25 Personal interview with Guatemalan diplomat who requested anonymity, Guatemalan mission to the OAS, 
Washington, DC, July 17, 2008. 
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they will tend to prefer specific forums over others.  One of the most interesting findings is 
that the selection of forum cannot always be attributed to the institutional qualities of those 
international organizations.  The results do not seem to be fully consistent with theories that 
focus on flexibility, centralization or organizational membership.  Forum shopping is 
difficult to note without analyzing the countries’ motives, which quite often lie outside the 
institutions themselves.  When states make a forum choice, through action or inaction, their 
decisions affect the forum for dispute.  Therefore, this study suggests the need to look for 
exogenous factors that can account for institutional choice and not just institutional outcome 
or efficiency.  Likewise, legal domestic traditions do not play a central role in explaining 
Latin America’s forum choices.   
Instead, the picture here presented supports a regional approach to the matter by 
focusing not only on the biases against regionally-based organizations, but on the geographic 
clustering of diffusion cases that are pronounced by neighborhood effects.  On the issue of 
biases, this article finds reason for cautious optimism about the potential role of regional 
forum shopping.  Regional forums in Latin America might help with logistical and 
operational matters regarding the implementation of a ruling, but seem to be inadequate to 
settle the disputes themselves.  No matter how many efforts are invested in making these 
organizations more flexible, binding or more economically appealing, their inadequacy is not 
the result of their design.  It is their location and the availability of other global forums and 
higher courts that greatly affects their use and appeal.  
With regards to forum shopping in global organizations, the findings in this research 
show that regional diffusion is a powerful force driving Latin American states towards global 
courts, such as the ICJ.  In some of the cases discussed here, what might appear the result of 
careful consideration to strategic interaction, reputational costs, and bargaining is really not 
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so.  To some extent, choosing the ICJ over other alternative forums is prompted by a 
contagious behavior in which proximate states emulate and imitate strategies, policies, and 
practices.  The limited size and relative homogeneity of the legal and foreign policy teams in 
Latin America reinforces these regional trends.   
  This analysis has only scratched the surface of a complex but fascinating area of 
research; yet, several issues remained unexplained and merit fuller analysis in the future.  For 
instance, is the diffusion effect exclusive to countries in the same neighborhood?  
Enthusiasm for the ICJ in Africa and Central Europe suggests diffusion patterns that go 
beyond Latin America.  Of course, room for refinement and additional research also exists; 
particularly in identifying the causes of emulation and diffusion.  The literature on 
international diffusion so far available offers varying and competing explanations as to why 
policies in one state attract the attention from other countries.  Constructivists like Martha 
Finnemore emphasize the role played by international organizations in creating new norms 
and patterns of behavior, in which imitation is triggered by an attempt to gain international 
legitimacy.  For cognitive-psychological theorists like Kurt Weyland, emulation is driven 
largely by inferences and judgments emanating from the decision-makers themselves.  A 
comparative analysis among countries with similar filing strategies in the ICJ might provide 
an interesting way of rigorously testing these competing explanations.  
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